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L INTRODUCTION 
The Brief of Respondent filed in this matter reflects a substantial and substantive failure 
to respond to the arguments which Petitioner has made in this post-conviction relief proceeding. 
The State has made erroneous and materially incomplete assertions about the relevant facts of 
this case which appear in its "Statement of Facts," its "Issue" and its "Argument." The State's 
Argument is comprised of a variety of legal arguments which are either erroneous, superfluous 
or relevant only to matters which have already been resolved in the criminal proceeding or to 
facts other than those in the record of this matter. 
In hopes of providing a coherent response to Brief of Respondent, Mr. Pentico will first 
address the erroneous assertions about the facts without regard to where in the Brief of 
Respondent those assertions are made. Then, in a separate section of this response, Mr. Pentico 
will address the arguments made by the State. 
II. RESPONSES RELATED TO RESPONDENT'S ERRONEOUS ASSERTIONS 
ABOUT THE RELEVANT FACTS. 
The disconnection between this case and the case the State appears to prefer to debate 
first manifests within the State's version of the facts relevant to this appeal. There are two 
distinct and important instances of this disconnect within the Statement of Facts ( one of which 
bleeds over into the State's incomplete framing of the "Issue") and two others within the 
Argument. 1 
1 Distinct but not so important is the fact that the State consistently refers to the visit to the 
Governor's Office as having occurred on April 6 when the record in both this case and in State v. 
Pentico makes it clear that the visit at issue occurred on April 2, 2008. 
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First, the State attempts to truncate the facts relevant to the resolution of this case by 
making reference within the Statement of Facts not to the Record of this case but to the Court of 
Appeals summary of the Record as it existed at the close of the criminal proceedings against Mr. 
Pentico. Brief of Respondent, p. 1. This attempt to narrow the relevant facts is foundational to a 
later argument that Pentico did not create an adequate record to preclude summary dismissal of 
his claim for post-conviction relief. The reality is that Pentico has put into the record the factual 
foundation which was not, as a result of ineffective assistance of counsel, part of the record in 
the appeal of State v. Pentico. Specifically, he has demonstrated that he was, on March 25, 
2008, doing nothing more than entering the Capitol grounds on his way to meet with a legislator 
for the purpose of seeking her help in addressing a grievance he had with State government. 
Wbile he had been to her office earlier that day seeking that meeting, he had not been to the 
Governor's office or the Department of Education that day. 
While it had the opportunity to do so, the State did not make any attempt to controvert 
that factual foundation. The State offered no affidavits providing admissible evidence relevant 
to the circumstances which led up to the demand that Mr. Pentico leave the Capitol grounds and 
that he thereafter refrain from returning to those grounds or going to the Governor's office or the 
Department of Education. 
Second, the State has, in its Statement of Facts, acknowledged the existence of more than 
one constitutionally based claim made in Mr. Pentico's petition for post-conviction relief but it 
only identifies one of them. Brief of Respondent, p. 1. The State apparently would prefer to 
focus the consideration of this Appeal only upon the constitutionality of the "ask to leave" which 
occurred on March 25. But this approach masks over the other properly raised and presented 
claims, both premised in the absolute absence of procedural due process. 
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Indeed, this March 25th centric focus carries over to the State's stated "Issue" which 
frames the issue in a manner so as to suggest that the only question the Court needs to consider is 
whether Mr. Pentico failed to show that the March 25th "ask to leave" was based upon the 
content of his speech. This framing of the issues ignores that Mr. Pentico has consistently 
claimed and amply demonstrated that the March 25th "ask to leave" impaired his efforts to 
exercise his right to petition the government for redress of grievances in a manner comm~mly 
employed by citizens. In addition, it fails to account for the fact that Mr. Pentico has also raised 
significant procedural due process challenges to the application, under the circumstances of this 
case, of the one year automatic exclusion. 
In both regards, his attorney in the criminal matter failed to raise these constitutional 
challenges or to develop the record necessary to preserve them for appeal. However, now that 
the claims are raised and the record to support them is established, the State seeks to ignore 
them. The State never cites any authority or makes any argument in support of an application of 
the statute in a manner that absolutely deprives Mr. Pentico from access to traditional and 
designated public forums for one year without regard to the reason that he might seek to enter 
those properties and without any form of procedural due process. 2 
In the course of its Argument, the State, apparently in recognition that it has no factual 
basis for challenging Mr. Pentico's claims about the unconstitutionality of the "ask to leave" 
which occurred on March 25, 2008, attempts to draw into the record what it characterizes as 
2 The State does mention that Mr. Pentico challenges the "exclusion from certain State property 
for a year" but does so in the context of the erroneous assertion that Mr. Pentico premised this 
challenge upon an a claim of facial over breadth. Brief of Respondent, p. 9. The State also 
seems to claim that a re-entry ban is authorized by Virgina v. Hicks, 539 U.S. 113, 123 (2003) 
but that case does not consider the procedural due process issues and does not appear to have 
involved an initial exclusion form a traditional public forum for no apparent reason and 
subsequent entry upon a designated public forum for the purpose of using that property in 
conformance with its purpose. 
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"evidence" from the Court of Appeals' decision in State v. Pentico, Brief of the Respondent, p. 
4. The problem Vvith this attempt, other than the fact that it goes outside of the record in this 
matter, is that the Court of Appeals characterized this information only as "references" at 
sentencing to possibly relevant conduct. It is not even clear that these "references" were based 
upon sworn testimony capable of serving as "evidence" or merely prosecutorial argument based 
totally upon hearsay and potentially never capable of being evidence in any proceeding. 
Moreover, there is no way to tell from the Court of Appeals' articulation of these prior events 
whether the problems arose from the content of speech or from activities which warranted 
ejection and exclusion from a traditional public forum. In the end, if the State had evidence it 
thought relevant to this matter, it should have filed affidavits. As it did not, Mr. Pentico is 
entitled to have the summary dismissal proceed on the record as it exists in this action. As a 
consequence, the Affidavit of Mr. Pentico provides the unrebutted evidence which must be 
considered in determining if summary dismissal of Mr. Pentico's petition for post-conviction 
relief was warranted. 
The final instance which demonstrates the apparent disconnect between the facts of this 
case and the facts as the State would prefer them to be also appears in the State's Argument. The 
State claims: 
"To show that his constitutional rights were violated on March 25, Pentico's trial counsel 
would have had to prove that the exclusion from the Governor's offices that day was 
based on the content of Pentico' s speech as opposed to a content neutral decision or one 
based on non-communicative conduct, volume or active disruption of the activities of 
others." 
Brief of Respondent at p. 7. This assertion obviously conflates two separate events but it does 
so in a way that suggests a foundational confusion about the issues actually presented in this 
case. Mr. Pentico claims and the facts demonstrate that on March 25th he was, for no apparent 
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reason interrupted in the course of seeking to speak to a legislator about a grievance he had with 
a governmental entity. There was no need for him to attempt to prove the negative (that the 
ejection from the Capitol grounds was premised upon non-content based grounds) because the 
right being obstructed was not "speech" but rather the right to "petition" and the unrebutted 
evidence clearly demonstrates that this occurred for no apparent reason. On the other hand, Mr. 
Pentico's trip to the Governor's office has already been determined not to have involved a 
constitutionally protected activity but this fact has nothing to do with a determination of the 
constitutionality of the "ask to leave" on March 25 or of Mr. Petico's claims based upon 
procedural due process. In sum, the two events are distinct and the issues related to them, at this 
point do not involve a question of whether Mr. Pentico's exclusion from the Governor's office 
was based upon the content of his "speech" that day, April 2, 2008. 
III. RESPONSES RELATED TO RESPONDENT'S ERRONEOUS ARGUMENTS 
Any consideration of the issues raised in this case must begin with a correct appreciation 
of the core issues and arguments and recognition of the lack of relevant decisional law. The 
Brief of Respondent reflects a failure in both respects. 
Indeed, Mr. Pentico cannot identify a single argument set out in the Brief of Respondent 
which addresses either of the procedural due process claims asserted by Mr. Pentico ( or the 
related ineffective assistance of counsel claim) relative to the automatic one year exclusion 
provided for in LC. § 18-7008(A)(8) which provides the foundation for criminalizing his April 
2nd visit to the Governor's reception area. Apparently, the State has no response to these 
arguments. But, whether it does or it does not, the State has not stated a response and it has not 
even acknowledged that these procedural due process claims are an issue before the Court. As 
such, the State would appear to be precluded from addressing these due process claims or the 
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affiliated ineffective assistance of counsel claim during oral argument. Rhead v. Hartford Ins. 
Co., 135 Idaho 446,452 (2001). The Court and Mr. Pentico should not be required to speculate 
as to the specific issues and arguments that the State \\,111 raise at oral argument. Nor should the 
State be afforded the tactical advantage of argument-by-ambush which would result by allowing 
it to raise issues and present arguments that are not presented within its briefing. Accordingly, it 
is appropriate to conclude that the State has waived the opportunity to respond to Mr. Pentico's 
procedural due process challenges and to his claim of ineffective assistance of counsel premised 
upon those challenges. 
As a starting point for an analysis of the issues presented in this case, one must appreciate 
that Mr. Pentico contends that, but for the events of March 25, 2008, his conduct on April 2, 
2008, (visiting the reception area of the Governor's Office) could never be found to be a 
violation of any law of this State. On April 2, 2008, he went to a place which was open during 
office hours to all members of the public who wanted to communicate with the Governor or his 
staff. While he was there he delivered a letter expressing concerns and grievances, just as any 
member of the public would be free to do. There is no claim or evidence to support a finding 
that doing so is not a legitimate reason for going to the Governor's office. Once the letter was 
delivered, he turned and left. There is no claim or evidence that he did anything else. While he 
was there he did not violate any rules or regulations and he never refused to leave that office on 
that day after being asked to do so. 
On these facts, the ruling in State v. Korsen, 138 Idaho 706, 69 P.3d 126 (2003) 
abrogated in part upon other grounds, Evans v. Michigan, 133 S.Ct. 1069, 1074 (2013), which 
the State relies upon, actually provides no authority for charging or convicting him with a 
violation of LC. § l 8-7008(A)(8) based solely upon his conduct on April 2, 2008. Indeed, 
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Korsen, provides very limited guidance which is relevant to any of the issues presented in this 
post-conviction ruling proceeding. The Court held that the statute was not, as to its "ask to 
leave" portion, facially overbroad because, even as it could be applied to public property 
(specifically government o\\'ned, non-public forums, such as office building), there were many 
instances in which the statute could be enforced without adversely impacting a citizen's 
protected rights. Korsen at 715-716. But Mr. Pentico is not claiming in this proceeding that the 
statute is facially overbroad. 
The Korsen Court did not hold that the statute could be applied to all citizens on 
government owned property without regard to their reason for being there, that it could be 
applied to citizens present on a traditional public forum or that the "one year exclusion" portion 
of the statute could be constitutionally applied to Mr. Korsen or any other citizen. Indeed, the 
Court specifically acknowledged that there were circumstances (such as presence on the Capitol 
grounds) as to which the statute could be over broad and thus unconstitutional on an "as applied" 
basis.3 Indeed, all that Korsen concluded was that the "ask to leave" portion of the statute was 
not facially overbroad and that it could constitutionally be applied to Mr. Korsen where at the 
time he was asked to leave he had completed his legitimate business at that government building. 
Thus, to the extent that Korsen has any relevance to the claims at issue in this case, it teaches 
only that standing alone nothing Mr. Pentico did on April 2, 2008, could be the basis for a 
criminal prosecution founded upon LC. § 18-7008(A)(8). Thus, if he was not otherwise legally 
3 Here it is worth noting that the State claims, without citation of authority, that the assertion that 
statutory overbreadth can be considered and dealt with only as a "facial" or "as applied" basis is 
"an erroneous legal assertion" and that any argument premised upon "as applied" overbreadth 
can be disregarded. Respondent's Brief at pp. 8-9. Clearly, the Idaho Supreme Court 
recognizes the concept that a statute may be overbroad as applied and does so with the 
expectation that any over-reaching effect of the statute can be cured on a case-by-case basis. 
State v. Korsen, at 715, see also, Broadrick v. Oklahoma, 413 U.S. 601, 614-615 (1973). 
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barred from going to the Governor's office, his visit to that office on April 2, 2008, could not be 
treated as a trespass pursuant to LC. §18-7008(A)(8). 
Virginia v. Hicks, 539 U.S. 112 (2003) which is also cited by the State is no more helpful 
to the resolution of this case than is Korsen. In Hicks, the Court upheld, against a facial 
overbreadth challenge, a criminal trespass prosecution of an individual who had returned to a 
housing development owned and operated by a governmental entity after having been previously 
ordered to leave and to not return; the similarities between that case and this end there. In 
Hicks, the streets on which Mr. Hicks trespassed had been abandoned by the City and were 
clearly posted so as to identify them as private streets and to announce the intention to pursue 
trespass charges against anyone who entered them without authorization. The controlling 
governmental entity had adopted a specific policy regulating the use of the streets and to 
authorize the police to issue ejection/exclusion notices to any person who used the streets 
without being able to demonstrate a "legitimate business or social purpose." Obviously, there is 
no similar posting or regulating of the Capitol grounds where Mr. Pentico was initially 
confronted or of the Governor's office reception area. 
Moreover, the evidence pertaining to Mr. Hicks' specific conduct and to the impact of the 
exclusion was materially different from the record in this case. Mr. Hicks was known to the 
regulating entity as a habitual trespasser and vandal. While Mr. Hicks had requested that the 
property administrator grant him permission to re-enter and he had been denied that permission 
there was no showing that he would have been denied that permission if he had shown that he 
had a legitimate business or social purpose or if he had made the request in order to engage in a 
constitutionally protected activity. Here there is no evidence that Mr. Pentico was a habitual 
trespasser or vandal. There was no regulation, no posting and no need for him or any other 
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citizen to seek permission to enter the Capitol grounds to speak to a legislator or the reception 
room of the Governor's office to deliver a letter to the Governor. Even if the State could 
constitutionally regulate access to the Capitol building to those \Vith legitimate business, social or 
constitutional purposes, Mr. Pentico's desire to elicit the help of a legislator is consistent with 
what happens every day during the legislative session. In addition, it is evident that in the Hicks 
case there was an administrator who could be approached for permission - hence some minuscule 
procedural due process here Mr. Pentico could not even find out who had issued the order that 
he be excluded. In the end, the only bearing that the decision in Hicks has upon this case is that 
it provides at least a basis for the argument that the Korsen Court was correct in concluding that 
LC. § 18-7008(A)(8) is not facially overbroad. But that is not an issue presented in this case. 
Thus, the case law relied upon by the State fails to provide a foundation for a 
determination that the "ask to leave" on March 25th was a constitutionally valid application of 
LC.§ 18-7008(A)(8). Moreover, there is no showing that if the "ask to leave" was itself invalid 
that the "one year exclusion" could lawfully follow from that invalid "ask to leave." Hence, the 
asserted wrongfulness of his conduct on April 2, 2008, turns, not upon what Mr. Pentico did or 
did not do while in the reception area of the Governor's office, but rather upon the claim that he 
could be, based on the events of March 25, 2008, barred from being there altogether on April 2, 
2008. Mr. Pentico's Trial Counsel failed to appreciate this fact. As a result, he failed to 
appreciate the substantial and heretofore unresolved constitutional challenges which arise from a 
prosecution based upon Mr. Pentico's visit to a public space in the Governor's office on April 2, 
2008, because of events which occurred eight days earlier. 
In particular Trial Counsel failed to recognize that: 
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I. He had available to him, what is thus far, unrebutted evidence that Mr. 
Pentico was, on March 25, 2008, peacefully entering the Capitol grounds for the 
purpose of speaking to a legislator to seek help in addressing a grievance 'With a 
governmental entity. As a consequence, he did not realize that Korsen provided 
him with authoritative argument that the "ask to leave" was unconstitutional and 
the accompanying "one year exclusion" was not premised on a lawful "ask to 
leave" and had no lawful effect. In this regard, that Idaho Supreme Court 
specifically recognized that: 
Assuming that a criminal trespass prosecution is filed pursuant to I. C. § 18-
7008(8) sic. against a person on public property who is exercising his or 
her free speech rights, the statute could be attacked as applied to that 
constitutionally protected conduct. 
Korsen, Id 
2. Even if there was a lawful basis to ask Mr. Pentico to leave the Capitol 
grounds as he was peacefully entering upon them and heading to a meeting with a 
Legislator, the seemingly life-time exclusion (or even the one year exclusion set 
out in LC. 18-7008(A)(8)) from the Capitol grounds and other identified State 
properties where citizens regularly interface with elected officials and 
governmental administrators presented compelling and invalidating procedural 
due process issues. 
Ultimately, the two pronged constitutional challenge which needed to be raised and 
which was not raised is: "Can a citizen, who is doing nothing more than entering the Capitol 
building in order to speak to a legislator, lawfully be told to leave that property and to stay off of 
others and, if so, can he lawfully be automatically barred thereafter from entering identified State 
properties for a year." Mr. Pentico has demonstrated a criminal prosecution premised upon the 
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claim that LC. § 18-7008(A)(8) validates such an "ask to leave" and a subsequent "one year 
exclusion" has fatal constitutional defects and he has asserted that these defects have never been 
addressed or resolved in any decisional law. The State has made no attempt to respond directly 
to these arguments and it has failed to direct the Court's attention to any relevant decision which 
resolves the constitutional challenges which should have been but were not raised. Instead, the 
State offers a number of irrelevant, obtuse and erroneous arguments. 
The State seeks to treat this as a "speech" case and to have the Court conclude that 
Pentico cannot prevail because he has not shown that he was ordered off of a traditional public 
forum based upon the content of his speech as opposed to his conduct. Brief of Respondent pp. 
6-7. This contention ignores both the fact that the First Amendment affords protection to 
activity beyond free speech to petition the Government for redress of grievances - and the 
unrebutted evidence that at the time he entered the Capitol grounds Mr. Pentico was on his way 
to do just that in a normal and commonly accepted manner to speak to a legislator in person. 
While this point is important to keep in mind, it does not invalidate the State's argument that the 
exercise of First Amendment rights are subject to reasonable time, place and manner, 
restrictions. 
While such restrictions can be upheld, the State has provided this Court with no evidence 
of the existence of any time, place and manner restrictions (let alone reasonable ones) which are 
relevant to this case. Indeed, from the record it appears that the State thinks that it is permissible 
for State police to order citizens on their way to speak to a legislator about a grievance to leave 
State property for any reason or no reason at all. The State has provided this Court with no 
authority for such an application of LC. § 18-7008(A)(8) and no evidence of any conduct which 
would warrant ejection from a traditional public forum (the very government-owned property 
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which the Court in Korsen acknowledged would require a different approach than was taken in 
that decision). 
The State argues that the unrebutted evidence of Mr. Pentico's mission is insufficient 
because he has not proven that the "ask to leave" was premised upon his protected conduct as 
opposed to unprotected conduct, Brief of Respondent p. 8. Other than unreasonably expecting 
him to prove a negative when, if any relevant evidence exists it is in possession of the State 
(though not disclosed to the Court), this assertion ignores the clear import of the evidence in the 
records. And in summary dismissal proceedings Mr. Pentico is entitled to the benefit of the 
reasonable inference that he did not engage in any unprotected conduct. Given that the State has 
failed to put any evidence in the record which could rebut this inference, there is no basis upon 
which to conclude that there was a reasonable basis for asking him to leave a traditional public 
forum or directing him to thereafter stay off of traditional and designated public forums. Thus, 
there is not only a question of fact which could be resolved in favor of Mr. Pentico and which 
justifies the requested relief, there is a question of fact which must be resolved in his favor. On 
this record there is no merit to the claim that he has failed to satisfy his burden of demonstrating 
a prima facie case in support of his claim that he was unconstitutionally ejected from a traditional 
public forum and excluded from both that traditional public forum but also a designated public 
forum. 
Similarly, the State appears to contend that Mr. Pentico cannot prevail in this matter 
because he has not shown that the instruction that he not return to the Capitol and that he stay off 
of identified government owned properties was a response to his speech as opposed to his 
conduct. Brief of Respondent p. 8. This argument continues the attempt to make Mr. Pentico 
responsible to prove the negative when the State possesses any evidence that the order was 
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premised upon conduct subject to regulation but it also ignores Mr. Pentico's assertion that given 
the clear and expressed structure of the unambiguous statute (which the courts of this State are 
obligated to accept without regard to whether the result seems rational, Verska v St Alphonsus 
RMC, 151 Idaho 889, 895-896, 265 P.3d 502, 508-509(2011)) the validity of the exclusion turns 
upon whether a valid "ask to leave" occurred. As no valid and enforceable "ask to leave" 
occurred in this case there could be no ongoing exclusion. 
Moreover, this argument ignores that Mr. Pentico's primary challenge to the "one year 
exclusion" is based upon the forfeiture without any form of procedural due process of his right to 
proceed as any other citizen to move about and to petition the government. The closest that the 
State comes to even acknowledging that the procedural due process issue has been an issue since 
the filing of the petition for post-conviction relief is an attempt to deflect the argument by 
claiming that Mr. Pentico has not shown that the one year exclusion actually curtailed his access 
to a public forum or his exercise of "his right to free speech." Brief of Respondent pp. 10-11. 
The facts of this case demonstrate that Mr. Pentico was arrested while in the process of pursuing 
his right to petition the Government for the redress of grievances in a designated public forum 
and in a fashion available to all other citizens. Clearly his access was, by the State Police, seen 
as being curtailed. The fact that he did not thereafter go onto the Capitol grounds carrying a sign 
protesting his exclusion from those grounds in order to show that he would have been arrested 
should not be held against him as the failure to do so is a rational response to having been 
stopped, cuffed and cited after merely delivering a letter to the Governor's office. 
The State seeks to capitalize on the fact that Mr. Pentico did not disprove or deny matters 
which are not in the record, which are not demonstrated by any evidence offered by the State, 
which are not even clearly based upon evidence as opposed to argument and which are not 
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clearly conduct issues as opposed to content issues. Brief of Respondent p.8. It would appear 
that the State is attempting to avoid the existence of a question of fact in a situation in which it 
made no attempt to properly raise one by urging the Court to require Mr. Pentico to prove 
negatives. Mr. Pentico contends that there is no evidence in this record and indeed no 
"evidence" that his "no reason at all" ejection on March 25, 2008, was based on anything other 
than the fact that he entered the Capitol grounds on that day to seek assistance of a legislator in 
an attempt to redress his grievance with government. If such evidence exists, it was the State's 
responsibility to present it, not Mr. Pentico' s responsibility to rule out its existence. 
The State attempts to frame Mr. Pentico's challenge to the exclusion as an overbreadth 
claim. Brief of Respondent pp. 8-9. Then it attacks that claim as being based on an erroneous 
legal argument (that there is no "as applied" overbreadth claim), Brief of Respondent p.9 and as 
lacking an evidentiary foundation (no evidence Pentico was "exercising any constitutional rights 
on April 6" (sic), Brief of Respondent p.9). While there are issues with both of these assertions, 
neither, even if completely accurate, is relevant to the claims stated in the petition for post-
conviction relief or in any of the briefing. Mr. Pentico's challenge to the exclusion portion of the 
statute, without which his visit to the Governor's reception room would not have been a trespass, 
is not based upon an overbreadth claim. 
Mr. Pentico has claimed the one year exclusion is an impermissible prior restraint upon 
his exercise of his First Amendment Rights (speech and protest) and therefore works as a 
forfeiture of these rights. He has also claimed that this forfeiture of rights as well as the 
exclusion itself (preventing him from going where other citizens can freely go to conduct 
business with the government) are both impermissible because the statute mandates the exclusion 
without regard to the circumstances and justifications for the "ask to leave" and makes no 
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provision for any form of pre-ejection or post-ejection procedural due process. Without a 
procedure that affords him the opportunity to challenge the basis for the exclusion or the scope or 
duration of the exclusion he is left with no protection against completely arbitrary and 
unreasonable enforcement.4 The State's argument regarding overbreadth simply does not 
address either of these issues. 
IV. CONCLUSION 
For the forgoing reasons it is respectfully submitted that the Court should reverse the 
Order Granting Summary Dismissal and remand the matter to the Trial Court for further 
proceedings in accordance with this Courts determination of the issue raised herein. 
~ 
DATED, this ~ __ day of February, 2014. 
HEIDI Jms~~ ·~ 
Attorney for Defendant 
4 It is worth noting that while a challenge based upon the lack of procedural due process does not 
seem to require a specific showing that the exclusion would have been removed ifthere has been 
some form of due process proceeding, the record in this case, as it currently stands, demonstrates 
that in Mr. Pentico's case the one year exclusion was triggered by a baseless and unconstitutional 
"ask to leave." Hence, on this record there is every reason to believe he would have benefitted 
from a due process procedure. 
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